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JERSEY

MU-

HAVE THE POWER TO ENACT RENT CONTROL ORDI-

NANCES-Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 120 N.J. Super. 286,
293 A.2d 720 (L. Div. 1972).
The boroughs of Fort Lee and River Edge, New Jersey, in order
to insure that rents in apartment dwellings would not continue to
rise, enacted legislation to control the rents and rent increases that
landlords might charge tenants." A critical shortage of available housing units in these municipalities, practically forcing tenants to renew
their leases, had placed landlords in a position to exact exorbitant
increases from tenants. This practice by landlords had been popularly
labeled "rent gouging."' 2 The growth of this practice, combined with
the critical shortage of housing, led the two municipalities to declare
that an emergency condition existed.3
The ordinances, designed to curtail the practice of rent gouging,
do permit rental increases when they are based on cost-of-living increases, maintenance costs, capital improvement costs, property tax
increases, and general "hardship" factors. 4 All the powers deemed
1 Fort Lee, N.J., Ordinance 72-1, Feb. 2, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Ordinance 72-1];
River Edge, N.J., Ordinance 552, Jan. 17, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Ordinance 552].
2 Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 120 N.J. Super. 286, 292, 293 A.2d 720, 723 (L.
Div.), cert. granted, 61 N.J. -, 296 A.2d - (1972), see Friedman v. Podell, 21 N.J. 100, 121
A.2d 17 (1956); Foti v. Heller, 48 N.J. Super. 57, 65-66, 137 A.2d 10, 15 (App. Div. 1957)
(purpose of rent control acts is to stabilize rents and to prevent extortionate increases while
at the same time allowing landlords a fair and equitable return upon their investment).
3 The preamble to Ordinance 72-1, supra note 1, (which is very similar to 552) states:
WHEREAS, the governing body of the Borough of Fort Lee does hereby declare that an emergency exists within the Borough of Fort Lee with respect to
the rental of housing space in multiple dwellings not subject to rent regulation
by reason of the demands for increases in rent which are determined by said
government body to be exorbitant, speculative, and unwarranted and that such
increases are causing severe hardships upon tenants and are adversely effecting
[sic] the health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of the Borough of Fort
Lee warranting legislative action by the governing body.
WHEREAS, under the police powers granted to the Mayor and Council of
the Borough of Fort Lee in order to protect and promulgate the health, safety
and welfare of the citizens of the Borough of Fort Lee a Rent Leveling and
Control Board is determined to be necessary within the Borough of Fort Lee.
See 5 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16.15, at 151-52 (3d ed.
1969) (footnotes omitted), wherein it is stated:
The general rule is that an ordinance need not recite the reasons or necessity
for its enactment. Even where the charter or statute provides that in certain
ordinances the necessity for the passage of an ordinance be declared, the view has
been taken that failure in this respect does not render the ordinance void, since
its passage is equivalent to declaring its necessity. The law, when enacted, furnishes its own reason.
4 Ordinance 72-1, supra note 1, §§ 2, 3, 4, 5, 10; Ordinance 552, supra note 1, §§ 2,
4, 5, 6, 12.
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necessary to execute the purposes of these ordinances were granted to
newly created Rent Leveling Boards in the boroughs.5
Owners of multiple-dwelling houses in Fort Lee and River Edge
and a Fort Lee homeowners' association, in Inganamort v. Borough of
Fort Lee,6 initiated suit challenging the validity of the rent control ordinances. The major grounds of the plaintiffs' challenge were: (1) the
enactments were preempted by federal legislation designed to occupy
entirely the field of rent regulation; 7 (2) municipalities generally lack
5 Ordinance 72-1, supra note 1, §§ 11, 12; Ordinance 552, supra note 1, § 10. One of
the attacks made by plaintiffs was directed at the delegation of power by the governing
body to the respective agencies. The court disposed of this contention by reminding the
plaintiffs that
[i]t has long been established that legislative delegations of power are permissible so long as they embody sufficient basic standards.

... If the legislative body establishes the basic policies, it may commit to an
administrative agency the authority to make rules and regulations to effectuate
them.
Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 120 N.J. Super. 286, 303-05, 293 A.2d 720, 729-30 (L.
Div. 1972). See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.11, at 605 (1958).
6 120 N.J. Super. 286, 293 A.2d 720 (L. Div. 1972). There was an attempt by plaintiffs
to show that the ordinances would cause a tax increase on residential property owners
and would add a tax surcharge to landlords of multiple-dwelling houses. The former argument was that although the cost of municipal services will continue to increase, the
income which owners derive from apartment houses will not. This will cause the assessed
value of such property to remain constant as will the tax revenues derived therefrom.
Therefore, plaintiffs argued, the difference must be borne by the residential property
owners. The court referred the plaintiffs to section 5 of the Fort Lee Ordinance, supra
note 1, which specifically allows an increase in municipal taxes to be passed on to
tenants; other sections of the ordinance require tenants to pay: differences in rentals as
reflected by percentage increases between consumer price indices at commencement and
termination of leases; hardship rental increases connected to mortgage payments; additional rental for capital improvements; and additional rental for increased or more costly
services. Ordinance 72-1, supra note 1. Since "apartment dwellers are not to be preferred
with respect to taxes or increased costs of municipal services," the homeowners' fear of
additional tax burdens was held to be groundless. 120 N.J. Super. at 296-97, 293 A.2d at 725.
Plaintiffs also maintained that since property owners must pay their taxes for the
first two quarters of the year on February 1 and May 1, while tenants pay their pro rata
shares of tax increases in six monthly payments commencing July 1 of each year, the
ordinances cause the landlord to "carry" his tenant for six months. Such a procedure was
alleged to be a deprivation of property without due process, and hence in violation of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Since apartment owners do not receive notice of a tax increase until after their bill
has been received on or about July 1, they are not required to pay it until the third and
fourth quarters (August 1 and November 1). The tenant will, therefore, be paying his
pro rata share during the same period as the landlord. Thus the court held that this
provision is not so arbitrary or oppressive as to constitute a violation of due process. Id.
at 300-01, 293 A.2d at 727-28.
7 Plaintiffs were referring specifically to Exec. Order No. 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 587 (1972).
(This Order was issued under the authority of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799). See generally Brookchester, Inc. v. Matthews, 118 N.J.
Super. 565, 289 A.2d 275 (Bergen County Dist. Ct. 1972).
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the power and authority to regulate rents and landlord-tenant relationships;" and (3) the municipal enactments were preempted by state
legislation designed to occupy entirely the field of rent regulation. 9 The
court held that when a housing crisis exists which requires broad powers
of rent control to protect public health, safety and general welfare,
then a local government has the right to regulate the rental of available dwellings as long as the regulations do not infringe on state or
federal authority. 10
During World War II and immediately thereafter, the federal government clearly had preempted the field of rent control. 1 Upon the
expiration of the federal controls, New Jersey passed the Rent Control
Act of 1953.12 After its expiration on June 30, 1956, the statute was
8 See, e.g., Grofo Realty Co. v. City of Bayonne, 24 N.J. 482, 132 A.2d 802 (1957).
9 This point was based on the New Jersey Rent Control Law of 1956, Law of July 31,
1956, ch. 146, [1956] N.J. Laws 605. In addition to these major challenges and the other
minor challenges discussed in notes 5 and 6 supra, plaintiffs claimed that there were two
procedural defects concerning the adoption of the Fort Lee ordinance: (1) a five minute
time limitation during which opponents and supporters thereof were permitted to voice
their viewpoints during the public discussion of the ordinance; and (2) the failure to
publicly advertise and hold a public meeting on an amendment to the ordinance. 120
N.J. Super. at 293, 293 A.2d at 723. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:49-2 (1967), which governs the
procedure to be followed in local enactments, mandates that every ordinance be discussed
at a public meeting. The statute imposes no bar to a five minute limitation on speakers.
Therefore, it was held that the time limitation did not render the ordinance voidable.
In discussing plaintiffs' second point, the court stated that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:49-2(c)
(1967) provides for a notice and hearing if an amendment is adopted which substantially
alters the substance of an ordinance. The amendment in question was adopted without
notice by the governing body of Fort Lee two weeks after the initial reading of the
ordinance, and it reduced the effective period of the ordinance from three years to one.
The court found that the amendment did not constitute such a substantial alteration of
the ordinance as to warrant its invalidation because, if anything, plaintiffs benefitted by
the change. 120 N.J. Super. at 294-96, 293 A.2d at 724-25.
The final claim by plaintiffs was that the Fort Lee ordinance, in defining "just cause"
for a landlord to refuse to let or re-let to a tenant, is incompatible with N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:18-53 et seq. (1967), which grants to landlords the remedy of a summary dispossess
proceeding for recovery of premises. The court held that legislation conditioning the
right to evict does not encroach upon that remedy existent in the field of landlord-tenant
relationships. However, even if the municipality had attempted to control evictions, the
entire ordinance would not be invalid because it contains a severability clause. 120 N.J.
Super. at 299-300, 293 A.2d at 726.
10 120 N.J. Super. at 330, 293 A.2d at 744.
11 See Wasservogel v. Meyerowitz, 300 N.Y. 125, 89 N.E.2d 712 (1949). The comprehensive scheme of federal rental legislation was contained in the Housing and Rent Acts
of 1947, 50 U.S.C. (APP.) §§ 1881 et seq. (1970). This statute and those hereinafter cited
were enacted at various times and, although expired, are retained for convenience in 50
U.S.C. (APP.) §§ 1 et seq. (1970). See also Second War Powers Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. (APP.)
§§ 631 et seq. (1970); Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. (APP.) §§ 901 et seq.
(1970).
12 Law of July 7, 1953, ch. 216, [1953] N.J. Laws 1622, as amended, Law of December
22, 1954, ch. 260, [1954] N.J. Laws 935.
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amended and retroactively applied to allow certain municipalities to
continue the rent control plans. 13 A controversy arose when the city of
Newark, prior to the extension of the 1953 Act, but before its expiration, enacted its own rent control ordinance. 14 In the ensuing case of
Wagner v. City of Newark, 15 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
attached to every municipal ordinance is the implied condition that it
must yield to the predominant power of the state, and that municipalities can control rents only under the terms of the statutes which delegated them this power. 16 This case was the basis of the plaintiffs' most
serious contentions.
Since Wagner, no challenges to the New Jersey municipal rent
control ordinances have been reported.' 7 Wagner, however, has been
cited in other spheres of attempted municipal regulation for the proposition that municipalities may not legislate in conflict with state
statutes. 18
It is a fundamental principle of governmental order that municipalities have no powers other than those delegated to them by the
legislature or by the state constitution. 19 Thus, the general principles
governing the concept of preemption call for the voiding of a local
enactment where it tends to conflict with a superior law, or where
there is a perceivable intention on the part of the legislature to arrogate
the entire field with which the local enactment endeavors to deal.2 0
The plaintiffs sought to apply these general principles of preemption to the then-effective federal wage and price controls. 21 The
court found that the municipalities' actions fully comported with the
13 Law of July 31, 1956, ch. 146, [1956] N.J. Laws 605.

14 Newark, N.J., Ordinance 6TA, June 21, 1956.
15 24 N.J. 467, 132 A.2d 794 (1957).
16 Id. at 480-81, 132 A.2d at 801.
17 In addition to Fort Lee and River Edge, nine other municipalities in New Jersey
have enacted legislation for the purpose of regulating rents: East Paterson, Englewood,
Irvington, Lakewood, Leonia, Lindenwald, New Milford, North Bergen and Wayne. Newark
Star-Ledger, Oct. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 3. The North Bergen ordinance was struck down in
Estate of Shilowitz v. Township of North Bergen, Docket No. L-11, 002-71 (N.J. Super. Ct.,
L. Div., Jan. 14, 1972). In that case Judge Larner held that Wagner was controlling authority.
18 Ringlieb v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 59 N.J. 348, 352, 283 A.2d 97, 99
(1971); Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 552, 251 A.2d 761, 763 (1969);
Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 184, 148 A.2d 473, 476 (1959).
19 Ringlieb v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 59 N.J. 348, 351, 283 A.2d 97, 99
(1971).
20 State v. Ulesky, 54 N.J. 26, 29, 252 A.2d 720, 722 (1969); Summer v. Township of
Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 554, 251 A.2d 761, 764 (1969); In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
35 N.J. 358, 370-71, 173 A.2d 233, 239 (1961). These concepts will be discussed in detail
beginning at p. 371 infra.
21 Exec. Order No. 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 587 (1972).
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intent of the federal controls, 22 which was to curb the inflationary
spiral, and it refused to accept the federal preemption argument,
because no actual or implied conflict between federal and local actions
had occurred. The court reasoned that as long as the local ordinances
did not transgress the promulgated rules and regulations adopted
pursuant to Phase II,23 they amounted to nothing more than local
enforcement of the federal plan, actions entirely consistent with the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 24 Logically, the
next issue for the court's attention should have been the plaintiffs' claim
that municipalities generally do not have the power to enact rent control
ordinances, even if the state has not acted, because the issue of state
preemption would have to be considered only upon a finding that municipalities generally have the power to pass rent control legislation.
The Inganamort court premised its analysis upon the established
law that a municipality must act within the bounds of its delegated
authority, and this authority must be extracted from the state statutes
controlling the legislative activities of the various municipalities.2 5
Therefore, depending upon the scope of legislative grants, municipalities may act in either of two ways: (1) strict adherence to the
expressly delegated, specifically enumerated powers; 26 or (2) expanisve
27
use of implicitly granted powers to effectuate municipal functions.
The New Jersey constitution has provided for broad municipal police
powers:
The powers of ...

municipal corporations shall include not only

22 Id.

See 6 C.F.R. § 301 (1972).
120 N.J. Super. at 312, 293 A.2d at 734. See generally De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S.
144 (1960); United States v. Ruthstein, 414 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1969).
25 120 N.J. Super. at 312-13, 293 A.2d at 734; see Ringlieb v. Township of ParsippanyTroy Hills, 59 N.J. 348, 351, 283 A.2d 97, 99 (1971); In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35
N.J. 358, 370, 173 A.2d 233, 239 (1961); Edwards v. Borough of Moonachie, 3 N.J. 17,
21-22, 68 A.2d 744, 746 (1949).
26 See Old Colony Gardens v. City of Stamford, 147 Conn. 60, 62, 156 A.2d 515, 516
(1959); Ambassador East, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 399 Ill. 359, 366, 77 N.E.2d 803, 807
(1948) (cities in Illinois have no inherent powers but only such as are delegated to them
by law, and such as are necessarily incident to those granted, and a delegation of power
will be strictly construed); Tietjens v. City of St. Louis, 359 Mo. 439, 444-45, 222 S.W.2d
70, 73 (1949) (city has no inherent police power and its authority to exercise such power
must come from a specific delegation or from express or fairly implied grants of powers
in its charter).
27 Rivera v. City of Fresno, 6 Cal. 3d 132, 135, 490 P.2d 793, 794, 98 Cal. Rptr. 281,
282 (1971) ("home rule" city may legislate in any field of municipal affairs subject only
to the state constitution and its own municipal charter); City of Mequon v. Lake Estates
Co., 52 Wis. 2d 765, 773-74, 190 N.W.2d 912, 916 (1971) ("[C]ities . . . have only such powers
as are expressly granted to them and such others as are necessary and convenient to the
powers expressly granted ....
").
23
24
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those granted in express terms but also those of necessary or fair
implication, or incident to the powers expressly conferred, or essential thereto, and not inconsistent with or prohibited by this
28
Constitution or by law.

Further, the New Jersey legislature has granted broad police powers
to municipalities. The most general grant provides:
Any municipality may make, amend, repeal and enforce such
other ordinances, regulations, rules and by-laws not contrary to the
laws of this state or of the United States, as it may deem necessary
and proper for the good government, order and protection of persons and property, and for the preservation of the public health,
safety and welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and as
may be necessary to carry into effect the powers and duties con29
ferred and imposed by this subtitle, or by any law.
The Faulkner Act shows a similar intent where it states:
The general grant of municipal power contained in this article is intended to confer the greatest power of local self-government consistent with the Constitution of this State. Any specific
enumeration of municipal powers contained in this act or in any
other general law shall not be construed in any way to limit the
general description of power contained in this article, and any
such specifically enumerated municipal powers shall be construed as
in addition and supplementary to the powers conferred in general terms by this article. All grants of municipal power to municipalities governed by an optional plan under this act, whether
in the form of specific enumeration or general terms, shall be
liberally construed, as required by the Constitution of this State,
in favor of the municipality.8 0
These provisions effectively grant not only those powers expressly
delegated, but also those necessary for the proper exercise of the
entrusted muncipal functions.8 '
The authority of municipalities to act according to implied grants
of power consistent with their municipal functions is supported by
the case law of this and other states.8
28
29
80
31

2

In Summer v. Township of

N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7,
11 (emphasis added).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2 (1967).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:69A-30 (1950) (footnotes omitted).

State v. Boston Juvenile Shoes, 60 N.J. 249, 253-56, 288 A.2d 7, 8-10 (1972) (municiple sign control ordinance upheld). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Metropolitan Sanitary
Dist., 2 Ill. App. 2d 35, 38, 275 N.E.2d 756, 758 (1971) (municipal pollution control upheld
under Illinois law).
32 City of Birmingham v. West, 236 Ala. 434, 183 So. 421, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 662
(1938) (a municipality may prohibit acts which are not prohibited by state law); City of
Harlan v. Scott, 290 Ky. 585, 162 S.W.2d 8 (1942) (an ordinance may cover an authorized
field of local laws not occupied by general laws).
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Teaneck, 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an ordinance
designed to prevent the practice of "blockbusting 34 was a valid exercise of a municipality's police power. The court specified that this
power is limited to matters of local concern, the necessity and propriety
of which have been determined by the local governing body. However, the power does not extend to matters involving state policy or to
spheres of general public interest. 35 In State v. Mundet Cork Corp.,36
the defendant was convicted of violating the air pollution ordinance
of the Township of Hillside, New Jersey. The court held that an air
pollution ordinance is a legislative declaration that certain conditions
constitute a public nuisance and can therefore be prohibited as a
hazard to the public welfare. In this instance, enactment of the regulatory ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power conferred upon
37
municipalities.
Extension of the police powers of municipalities through the
"necessary and proper" clauses is analogous to the extention of federal
power announced in McCulloch v. Maryland.3 In that case it was
stated:
The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to
the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means ....
...

Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the

constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 39
The New Jersey Supreme Court found in Wagner v. City of
53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1969).
The Summer court defined blockbusting as "the practice of inducing owners of
property to sell because of the ... advent into the neighborhood of a member of a racial,
religious or ethnic group." Id. at 551, 251 A.2d at 762.
35 Id. at 552-53, 251 A.2d at 763.
36 8 N.J. 359, 86 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 819 (1952).
37 Id. at 369-71, 86 A.2d at 6-7. See also Whelan v. New Jersey Power & Light Co., 45
N.J. 237, 212 A.2d 136 (1965) (city was authorized by the broad grant of general powers
to make a contact with a utility to provide water for its citizens); Township of Livingston
v. Marchev, 85 N.J. Super. 428, 205 A.2d 65 (App. Div. 1964) (ordinance prohibiting parking
of trailers within limits of the township held to be a valid exercise of municipal police
power); Town of Nutley v. Forney, 116 N.J. Super. 567, 283 A.2d 142 (Essex County Ct. 1971)
(an ordinance providing that owners must remove and dispose of their pets' excrement held
valid);, State v. Greco, 86 N.J. Super. 551, 207 A.2d 363 (Atlantic County Ct. 1965) (ordinance
providing that a minor having false documents for the purpose of identification or establishing age shall be deemed a disorderly person was a proper exercise of the police power).
38 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).
39 Id. at 423, 430.
33
34
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Newark4° that the state had preempted the field of rent control, and
that a municipality lacked the power to legislate in an area reserved
for the state. Significantly, however, the lower court found that the
Home Rule Act and the Optional Municipal Charter Act 41 each granted
sufficiently broad police powers to authorize municipalities to adopt
ordinances regulating rental charges and evictions. 42 Chief Justice,
then Judge, Weintraub wrote that the history of rent control demonstrated the local nature of the problem. 43 The earlier rule of strict
limitation of municipal authority decisively changed as a result of the
1947 adoption of the present New Jersey constitution with its broader
44
grant of home rule powers.
In Wagner, the foundational element of the lower court's decision
was the existence of emergency housing conditions. The Newark ordinance recognized the existence of the emergency and declared the
ordinance to be necessary to protect the public health, safety and
welfare. 45 Such "emergency" has been defined as "an unusual public
exigency calling for the exercise of the police power to alleviate the
'46
common peril or need.
Rent control in this country had its origin in the early 1920's.
Block v. Hirsch47 sustained temporary emergency legislation for the District of Columbia which gave a tenant a holdover privilege, so long
as he paid the rent and performed the conditions prescribed by the
lease or as modified by the commissioner. The Supreme Court held
that the great emergency housing situation due to World War I
justified temporary regulation of rents, 48 and that the authority for
such legislation was found in the police power. In the following year,
in Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel,49 a social emergency, caused by
an insufficient supply of dwelling houses and apartments in New York,
sustained a resort to the police power to deal with a grave situation that
constituted a serious menace to the health, morality, comfort and peace
of a large part of the people of the state. 50
24 N.J. 467, 132 A.2d 794 (1957).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:42-4 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:69A-30 (1967).
42 42 N.J. Super. 193, 202, 126 A.2d 71, 76 (L. Div. 1956).
43 Id. at 206, 126 A.2d at 78.
44 Compare New Jersey Good Humor, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 124 N.J.L. 162, 11
A.2d 113 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940), with New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. East Brunswick
Township, 60 N.J. 222, 287 A.2d 725 (1972).
45 Newark, N.J., Ordinance 6TA, June 21, 1956.
46 Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 514, 109 A.2d 640, 647 (1954).
47 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
48 Id. at 138-40.
49 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
50 Id. at 250.
40
41
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A declaration of emergency housing conditions supported the
extension of police powers to municipal enactments of rent control
51
ordinances in Warren v. City of Philadelphia.
There, the city passed

an ordinance seeking to regulate and control housing accommodations
and evictions by establishing maximum rents and prohibiting evictions, except on certain grounds. The city alleged that there existed
an emergency housing shortage affecting the public health, safety and
welfare. The court upheld the ordinance controlling rents as a valid,
reasonable, non-arbitrary exercise of police power.5 2 The city had
relied solely on the grant of broad general powers in the First Class
City Home Rule Act of

194953

for its authority. Although there was

no specific power granted to cities to control rents, the court said that
the power for municipal control of rents and evictions did not have
to be specifically enumerated in the Act. 54 The court emphasized that
such a broad grant of power included the power to meet the emergency
situation arising from the housing crisis.
As the preceding cases have shown, it is usually necessary for
an emergency condition to exist before a municipality may act in
this field under its police power. 55 The absence of an emergency situation appeared to be the only ground for the court's decision to reject
municipal rent control in City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel,

Inc.56 It was held, inter alia, that a municipality has no power to enact a rent control ordinance, absent a specific legislative enactment
authorizing the exercise of such power.5 7 The city of Miami Beach,
upon determining that both inflation and a housing shortage existed
within the city, enacted an ordinance providing for the regulation
of rents in certain types of rental units.5 The plaintiffs contended
that the city did not have the inherent power to enact the ordinance
in question. The Florida Supreme Court, relying heavily on Wagner,
51 382 Pa. 380, 115 A.2d 218 (1955).
52 Id. at 386, 115 A.2d at 221-22.
53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (1957) (formerly § 3421.17) provides in part:
The charter* of any city adopted or amended in accordance with this act may
provide . . . for the exercise of any and all powers relating to its municipal
functions, not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or of this
Commonwealth, to the full extent that the General Assembly may legislate in
reference thereto . . . and with like effect, and the city may enact ordinances,
rules and regulations necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested in the city by the charter it adopts or
by this or any other law.
54 382 Pa. at 384, 115 A.2d at 221.
55 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
56 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
57 Id. at 803-04. See generally Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 109 A.2d 640 (1954).
58 Miami Beach, Fla., Code ch. 17A (1964).
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held that the Charter of the city of Miami Beach5" did not authorize
the city to enact a rent control ordinance, and that the power was not
implied under the broad grants of the general welfare provisions. However, ignoring the findings of the ordinance, the majority specifically
held that the housing conditions in the city, coupled with the cost of
living increases, did not constitute an emergency as defined in Levy
Leasing.6
In a strong dissent, Justice Ervin declared that the majority had
ignored the plain, clear, unambiguous language of Florida constitution61 which gives the City of Miami Beach the power to enact rent
control ordinances without receiving specific authorization from the
state legislature, as long as rent control is a municipal function, and
there is no contrary or superseding legislation. He also asserted that
there was, in fact, a serious housing emergency in the city due to the
influx of tourists and Cuban immigrants. Further, when inflation and
insufficient housing coalesce into a localized problem, rent control
62
properly becomes a discretionary matter for the local city government.
Summarizing the attempts at municipal rent regulation in the
various jurisdictions which grant broad municipal powers, but provide
no specific authorization for rent regulation, three factors are common:
the actual existence of an emergency condition; a declaration to that
effect by the ordinance; and a recognition of the emergency's existence
by the courts. Judicial recognition of the problem has great significance since
the declaration of an emergency is not conclusive, and the finding
as well as the continuance of the exigency upon which the operation of the law depends are subject to judicial inquiry.63
In Inganamort, however, the extent of the court's inquiry into the
59 Charter of the City of Miami Beach, Fla., § 6(x) provides in part that the City of
Miami Beach may:
[D]o all things deemed necessary or expedient for promoting or maintaining the
general welfare, comfort, education, morals, peace, health, and convenience of
said city, or its inhabitants and to exercise all of the powers and privileges
conferred upon cities or towns by the general law of Florida, when not inconsistent herewith.
60 261 So. 2d at 804-05.
61 FLA. CONsr. art. 8, § 2(b) provides in part:
Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers
to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions
and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.
62 261 So. 2d at 809-10.
63 Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 515, 109 A.2d 640, 647; see Home Building &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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alleged emergency conditions was limited to taking judicial notice of
the rental housing situation in the municipalities. Judicial notice of
emergency conditions was not without precedent. Samuelson v. Quinones64 took notice of the acute shortage of low income housing in
Newark and of the frequent non-compliance of the existing housing
with the city's housing ordinances and building codes. The action of
the Inganamort court was, in effect, the final step required to establish
the necessary criteria for the inherent police power of a municipality
65
to control rents.

The Inganamort court, to support its finding that municipalities
have the power to enact rent control legislation, analyzed the increasing scope of municipal authority and the varying conditions of rental
situations throughout the state. Since the days of the Wagner decision,
the courts have increasingly recognized that the economy and society
have changed, and that the scope of governmental responsibility has
increased tremendously. Often municipalities, exercising local control,
can more effectively deal with particular problems.6 6 The liberal use of
municipal power and the application of a more functional approach
to local problems entered the court's thinking in considering the
actions taken by the municipalities in this case. 6 7 It may be useful to
permit municipalities to act, for, being nearer the scene, they are more
likely to detect, and may be better situated to rectify, their special
problems. 6a A municipal act, within the bounds of delegated power,
enjoys a presumption of validity equal to the presumption that is
attached to a state statute.6 9 To support the effectiveness of municipal
regulations, the New Jersey courts are required to interpret statutes
liberally, and uphold the municipal power in dealing with local needs. 70
64 119 N.J. Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580 (App. Div. 1972). See 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 7212, at 442 n.1 (3d ed. 1943) for support of the court's taking judicial
notice that the legislation was enacted for emergency purposes. See also discussion note
112 infra.
65 The ordinances enacted by the boroughs declared that an emergency situation
existed. See note 3 supra.
66 See New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. East Brunswick Township, 60 N.J. 222, 227, 287
A.2d 725, 727 (1972); Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 553, 251 A.2d 761, 764
(1969). See also Diamond, Some Observations on Local Government in New York State, 8
BUFFALO L. REv. 27 (1958); Mott, Strengthening Home Rule, 39 NAT'L. MUN. Rxv. 172
(1950); Winter, Municipal Home Rule, A Progress Report, 36 NER. L. REv. 447, 448 (1957).
67 120 N.J. at 315, 293 A.2d at 735.
68 Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 553, 251 A.2d 761, 764 (1969); see
Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York, 54 COLUM. L. Rv. 311 (1954).
See generally Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1145
(1966).
69 Salisbury v. Borough of Ridgefield, 137 N.J.L. 515, 518, 60 A.2d 877, 879 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
70 Whelan v. New Jersey Power & Light Co., 45 N.J. 237, 212 A.2d 136 (1965) (the
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The court indicated that a liberal approach to municipal powers
is necessitated by the varying conditions throughout the state. For
example, some municipalities have vacancy rates in housing units of
about 0.01%, while others have up to a 3.00% vacancy rate; population
centers, metropolitan commuting, demands for housing, and other
factors all contribute to the differences in these rates."' These
[v]arying conditions, including, for example, the existence or lack
of sufficient housing, may very well give rise to problems in some
localities that find no counterpart in others. 72
The housing situation in some communities is so critical that emergencies exist, while other communities have no need for rent regulations
because of the virtual absence of multi-family dwelling units.

73

It is

this disparity among municipalities that may isolate one town with a
housing problem from its neighbor, or from the state at large, almost
forcing that town to exercise its power to protect its inhabitants. For
example, in New Jersey Builders Association v. East Brunswick Township,74 the court upheld the municipality's power to regulate building
contractors by amending the building code. The court declared that
regulation and supervision of building contractors is a matter that may
well call for different treatment in different parts of the state. Reflecting upon the very similar type of varying conditions affecting rent
control, the Inganamort court found it only apropos to extrapolate the
New Jersey Builders holding to include the supervision and control of
rental increases. 75 These considerations, the broad grants of municipal
police power, and the emergency rental conditions make it eminently
reasonable for a municipality containing a vast number of apartmenttype residences to enact the rent-leveling provisions embodied in the
ordinances under review.
Once it is established that municipalities have the inherent authority under the police power to control rents, the question arises as to
when they may exercise such power. It is rudimentary that a municipality may not pass an enactment that attempts to impose additional
courts must interpret statutes liberally in favor of the existence of local power to deal
with local needs).
71 U.S.

BUREAU
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THE CENSUS,
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POPULATION:

1970,

GENERAL

HOUSING

CHARACTERISTICS, Final Report HC(l)-A32, New Jersey 7-8.
72 New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. East Brunswick Township, 60 N.J. 222, 227, 287 A.2d

725, 728 (1972).
73 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION:

1970,

GENERAL HOUSING CHAR-

AcTERISTICS, Final Report HC(l)-A32, New Jersey 7-8.
74 60 N.J. 222, 287 A.2d 725 (1972).
75 120 N.J. Super. at 315-18, 293 A.2d at 735-37; see Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 205

Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954); Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 380, 115 A.2d 218
(1955); Burns v. Paulak, 63 Pa. D. & C. 388 (Philadelphia County C.P. 1948).
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requirements in a field which is fully occupied by the state. 76 In such

a situation the state is said to have preempted the field, thereby invalidating any municipal efforts to enter it. The invalidity arises, not
only from any conflict of language that may exist between statute and
ordinance, but also from the inevitable conflict in jurisdiction which
77
would result from dual regulations covering the same grounds.
Wagner exemplified such a conflict. There, the legislature had
granted rent control power to certain municipalities. The unilateral action taken by the city of Newark, unsanctioned by the state rent control
statute, created a definite conflict with the state statute that had clearly
established preemption by occupation. 78 In Wagner, there was no need
to review the legislative intent because that discussion is irrelevant
when the court is basing its decision on the occupation of the field. 79

Preemption by occupation of the field also existed in the case of Heubeck v. City of Baltimore.0 The city of Baltimore was deemed to have

had the power to enact rent control legislation by the terms of the
Maryland Home Rule Amendment and the Baltimore City Charter. 8'
There was, however, a clear and unmistakable limitation on the city's
power-in case of any conflict between a city or local law and the
state law, the state law controlled. When a subsequent rent control
ordinance by the city was found to have a provision dealing with the
right of eviction which conflicted with the state law, the ordinance was
declared invalid.8

2

The preemption existed because the state entirely

occupied the field of tenant evictions, precluding any judicial review
of the state's legislative intent in that field.

83
The case of MarshallHouse v. Rent Review and Grievance Board

presented a different type of preemption issue. A municipal by-law
s4
was passed by the city of Brookline under its general police power,
76 See State v. Ulesky, 54 N.J. 26, 252 A.2d 720 (1969).
77 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 176, 339 P.2d 801, 809 (1959).

78 24 N.J. at 480, 132 A.2d at 801.
'79 Comment, The State v. The City: A Study in Preemption, 36 S. CAL. L R.Ev. 430,
438 (1963).
80 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954).
81 MD. CONsT. art. XI-A, § 3, the Home Rule Amendment, provides in part that the
city of Baltimore, subject to the constitution and laws of Maryland, has full power to
enact local laws of the city, but in case of any conflict between the local law and any
state law, the state law shall control.
. The Baltimore City Charter, § 6(24) provides that the city of Baltimore has the
power by ordinance or such other method as may be provided in its charter to exercise
within the limits of Baltimore City all the power commonly known as the "police power"
to the same extent as the state has or could exercise that power within the city.
82 205 Md. at 211-12, 107 A.2d at 103.
83 357 Mass. 709, 260 N.E.2d 200 (1970).
84 MAss. CoNsT. amend, art. II, § 6 provides in part that any
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attempting to limit rent increases. When the municipality's authority
was challenged, the court found that the adoption of the by-law was not
an action incident to the exercise of an independent municipal power.8 5
In Massachusetts, a constitutional provision removes from the scope of
municipal legislative action civil laws governing civil relationships,
$'except as an incident to an exercise of an independent municipal
power."8 6 The court held that the purpose of the by-law's adoption was
primarily civic in that it afforded the rent board the power to remake
contracts creating tenancies. Thus, the by-law was within the proscription of the constitutional provision. The regulation of civil contracts,
including rent control, was declared to be preempted by the state.
There was strong dicta, however, that Massachusetts municipalities may
control rents without being preempted by the state if the purpose of
the by-law's adoption is public in nature, and not civil. 8 '
The question of preemption becomes more troublesome when the
state preempts a field by implication. This term is applied when the
state has not occupied the field, but where the court finds a legislative
intention to preempt."" This situation differs from preemption by occupation, where there is overt conflict because two legislative bodies
have entered the same field, because the state has indicated implicitly
rather than explicitly that it has preempted the entire field. Therefore,
regardless of any lack of grammatical conflict, any municipal intrusion
into the field is a nullity.
Thus, the doctrine of preemption, whether by occupation or by
implication, sounds in conflict. It is difficult to conceive of any type of
conflict between a statute and an ordinance when there is no statute
on point presently in existence. That was precisely the claim made by
the municipalities in Inganamort.The plaintiffs attempted to convince
the court that the New Tersey Rent Control Law of 1953, with its
subsequent amendments,8 9 was clearly indicative of the state's intent to
occupy the entire field of rent regulation. The law itself was only
effective until December 31, 1957, when it was allowed to expire. Upon
its expiration any preemption by occupation ceased to exist. The extown may, by the adoption . . . of local . . . by-laws, exercise any power . . .
which the general court has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent
with the constitution or laws enacted by the general court in conformity with
powers reserved to the general court by section eight, and which is not denied
... by its charter.
85 357 Mass. at 718, 260 N.E.2d at 207.
86 MAss. CONSr. amend. art. IT. § 7(5).
87 357 Mass. at 715, 260 N.E.2d at 205.
88 Comment. supra note 79, at 434.
89 Law of July 7, 1953, ch. 216, f19531 N.J. Laws 1622, as amended, Law of December
22, 1954, ch. 260, [1954] N.J. Laws 935.
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piration also nullified any jurisdictional conflict that might have arisen
between the statute and ordinance, because an expired law is an indication that the legislature intends to remove itself from a field. 90 The
court reasoned that such expiration clauses of the state legislation
clearly nullified any suggestion of preemptive intent, and concluded
that since the ordinances under consideration here presented no conflict with or duplication of any presently existing statutes, the field of
rent leveling has not been preempted by the state government. 91
Inganamort did not, however, thoroughly answer the question of
whether the state, having once acted in a field to the extent that it
occupied it entirely, has thereby indicated that that field remains
within the legislative province of the state, and municipalities are thereafter precluded from acting without a specific delegation of power. It
is clear that a municipality may act in an area in which the state has
acted, provided there is nothing incompatible in the particular state
law and local ordinance, and no pertinent state enactment suggesting
legislative intent to preempt the field entirely. 92 Then-Judge Weintraub, speaking for the lower court in Wagner, said that in dealing
with the problem of conflict between an ordinance and state law, the
circumstance that both in some way relate to the same general subject
and stem from the police power is not enough to establish fatal incompatibility. 93 Whether the legislature intended its action to preclude the

exercise of the delegated police power should be the court's major
consideration. It is reasonable to expect that when the legislature wishes
to restrain all local action in a certain field, it will express that purpose,
especially when the alleged preemption is of powers delegated to local
government. 94 The New Jersey Rent Control Act of 1953 did not say
that a municipality could not adopt rent control for all time. Even
when both a statute and a municipal ordinance relate to the same
subject, if they are not in conflict, both have been upheld. A statute
does not automatically, invalidate an ordinance merely because both
deal with the same subject. 9 The plaintiffs in Inganamort were thus
unable to show either occupational or jurisdictional conflict. The
criteria, then, for construing an ordinance that has been enacted in a
90 See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Mo. 1936).

91 120 N.J. Super. at 309-10, 293 A.2d at 732-33.
92 State v. Ulesky, 54 N.J. 26, 29, 252 A.2d 720, 722 (1969).
93 42 N.J. Super. at 209, 126 A.2d at 80.
94 Township of Chester v. Panicucci, 116 N.J. Super. 229, 237, 281 A.2d 811, 815
(App. Div. 1971).
95 See Belleville Chamber of Commerce v. Town of Belleville, 51 N.J. 153, 238 A.2d
181 (1968); Mogolefsky v. Schoen, 50 N.J. 588, 236 A.2d 874 (1967); Cranberry Lake Quarry
Co. v. Johnson, 95 N.J. Super. 495, 231 A.2d 837 (App. Div. 1967).
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field previously occupied by the state, when no preemption exists,
narrows to the inherent police power. Since it had already been found
that the municipalities in question had such power, there was no reason
to invalidate the ordinance.
Plaintiffs did attempt to show that the state has enacted legislation
to enable municipalities to control rents of apartments which are
deemed substandard. 96 It was claimed that this statute indicated an
intent by the state to control all aspects of rent control. The Inganamort
court found that the primary thrust of the statute was directed toward the problem of substandard housing only, not exorbitant rents,
and that the statute did not carve out a preemption of rent control
for all purposes or for all types of buildings. 97 However, a more subtle
argument underlying this point was not discussed by the court: since
the state specifically granted municipalities the power to control rents
of substandard housing units, was not the same specific delegation of
power required before a municipality could control rents of standard
multiple-dwelling units? In the substandard housing situation, the state
recognized the problem, and enacted legislation establishing in the
municipalities the power to uniformly deal with the problem. The
legislature has not taken cognizance of a uniform, statewide problem
of rents in standard housing, and has, therefore, not made any legislative enactment. It has discussed such rental problems recently, but no
action has been taken. 98 The mere fact of pending bills evidences no
legislative intention to preempt a field. 99 Therefore, since the state's
intent to totally preempt this field was absent, the municipalities,
acting according to their other delegated powers, could deal with
specific local problems by expanding control in this area. 0 0
The rules of supply and demand and their economic and constitutional impact on apartment renters weighed heavily in the court's
considerations. It was reasoned that the demand for housing units was
far in excess of the supply in the two defendant communities, and that
such conditions rendered the bargaining strengths of the parties unequal, weighted in favor of the landlord. 10 1 The court, therefore,
§§ 2A:42-74 et seq. (Supp. 1972-73).
120 N.J. Super. at 310, 293 A.2d at 733.
98 There have been a number of bills recently introduced in the New Jersey legislature to effect a statewide control of rents. These bills include: N.J. Assembly Bill 165,
introduced January 24, 1972; N.J. Assembly Bill 656, introduced February 10, 1972; N.J.
Senate Bill 117, introduced January 17, 1972; N.J. Senate Bill 118, introduced January
17, 1972; N.J. Senate Bill 675, introduced March 9, 1972.
99 120 N.J. Super. at 309, 293 A.2d at 732.
100 State v. Pinkos, 117 N.J. Super. 104, 106, 283 A.2d 755, 756 (App. Div. 1971).
101 The position of the controlling parties at the bargaining table was discussed in
96 N.J. STAT. ANN.
97
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advanced the theory that the continual rent increases were unfair
because they denied the tenant his "constitutional right" to be housed
continuously upon reasonable terms. 10 2 It was the court's opinion that
the right to be housed, as with those rights of food and clothing, is so
essential to life itself that it need not be expressly embodied in the
03

United States Constitution: 1

[I]f the unregulated laws of supply and demand decree that dwellings should skyrocket in price, leaving human beings without
104
homes, then these laws must be regulated.
It was noted by the court, however, that an equitable treatment of the
problem requires that the tenant's right to shelter must be consistent
with the owner's right to a fair profit. 0 5
Questions of due process are necessarily raised by the municipal
actions curtailing the property rights of apartment owners. The "police
power is a dynamic agency, vague and undefined in its scope, which
takes private property or limits its use when great public needs require."' 0 6 A limitation upon a single person's rights in order to protect
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In that case the
problem was the gross inequality of the bargaining position occupied by the consumer
in relation to the automobile industry. The court went on to say that
[t~here is no competition among the car makers in the area of the express warranty. Where can the buyer go to negotiate for better protection? Such control
and limitation of his remedies are inimical to the public welfare and, at the very
least, call for great care by the courts to avoid injustice through application of
strict common-law principles of freedom of contract. Because there is no competition among the motor vehicle manufacturers with respect to the scope of
protection guaranteed to the buyer, there is no incentive on their part to
stimulate good will in that field of public relations.
Id. at 391, 161 A.2d at 87. These findings by the court find direct application in the field
of landlord-tenant relationships.
102 120 N.J. Super. at 329, 293 A.2d at 743.
103 Although the Inganamort court cited no authority for this proposition, it may
have been construing these rights as part of the penumbra of rights impliedly reserved
in amendments I through VIII of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
104 120 N.J. Super. at 329, 293 A.2d at 743.
105 Id. at 329, 293 A.2d at 744.
106 People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 435, 130 N.E. 601,
605, appeal dismissed per stipulation, 257 U.S. 665 (1921). See also Block v. Hirsch, 256
U.S. 135 (1921) (deemed rent control a regulation pursuant to the police power and not
a taking which requires compensation); Stoneridge Apts. Co. v. Lindsay, 303 F. Supp. 677
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (due process not violated by city ordinance providing for emergency
maximum rent control); Meringolo, Rent Control: What Remains and its Future, 22
BROOKLYN L. REv. 207 (1956) (rent control legislation is not violative of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, does not interfere with interstate commerce or impair the obligation of contract, and does not take private property for public
use without just compensation); Note, Residential Rent Control: Stoneridge Apts. Co. v.
Lindsay, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 457 (1970) (discussion on the constitutionality of rent
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the rights of many is not a taking of property without due process,
"but, on the contrary, if properly carried out, it is but the use of due
process of law for the protection of the rights of all."'1 7 The passage of
rent controls, rather than depriving the landlord of his property,
attempts to balance the rights of those involved for the benefit of all.
The apartment owner must retain in his perception of values the
belief that a man's right in his property is not absolute. 0 8 The tenant's
rights do not have to give way to any superior right of the landlord
because all rights are relative, and there must be an accommodation
when they meet. 10 9
This decision reflects the increasing application of municipal
power to solve the growing list of local problems. When a rent emergency arises, local in nature, and a municipality is clothed with the
police power to protect the welfare of its citizens, that municipality
may act without overstepping its legitimate sphere, because such matters can no longer be reserved for the state without explicit expression
of legislative intent. 110 The Inganamortcourt, however, appeared to show
undue haste in upholding the expanded municipal power when it took
judicial notice of the critical element of an emergency housing condition. The court relied upon Samuelson v. Quinonesl" for support of
its action, but the authority of that case, when these facts are considered,
is highly questionable, since it is common knowledge that the housing
conditions in Newark are much different than in Fort Lee and River
Edge. An exigent housing problem might exist in a municipality having mainly luxury apartments, but the court must be thoroughly convinced that a declared public emergency is not just a public expediency.
Rather than taking judicial notice of such emergency, a substantial
amount of proof establishing emergent conditions should have been
112
required of the municipalities.
control legislation with special emphasis on the question of whether rent controls are a
taking of private property for public use without just compensation). See generally
Wickersham, The Police Power and the New York Emergency Rent Laws, 69 U. PA. L.
REV. 301 (1921); Annot., 16 A.L.R. 178 (1921).
107 Town of Nutley v. Forney, 116 N.J. Super. 567, 570, 283 A.2d 142, 144 (Essex
County Ct. 1971).
108 State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
109 Id. at 306, 277 A.2d at 373.
110 But cf. Wagner v. City of Newark, 24 N.J. 467, 132 A.2d 794 (1957).
111 119 N.J. Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580 (App. Div. 1972).
112 N.J.R. EvID. 9(2) allows judicial notice to be taken without request by a party of
(d) such facts as are so generally known or of such common notoriety within
the area pertinent to the event that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute ....
Since the emergency clause in the legislation is usually inserted as a matter of form to
make the act effective at once and may be the subject of dispute, it is imperative that the
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It is obvious, though, that rent gougers cannot be allowed to
dominate tenants who have been occupying the inferior position at
the bargaining table. The excuse by owners that the laws of supply and
demand have rendered the tenants vulnerable to economic plight is
not tenable. It may be true that the concept of competitive supply
and demand has fostered the free enterprise society, and preserves
the delicate economic balance without extrinsic forces. However, when
economic forces are used to gain an unfair advantage, the imposition
of controls looms as the only adjusting force able to eliminate the
113
inequities.
The upholding of municipal power to control rents on the basis
of inherent police power, though novel in this state, is by no means
repugnant to constitutional provisions of governmental order. Constitutions must be interpreted in light of the complex economic and
social needs of modern society, and they must be flexible enough to
change with the times.'1 4 The police power of municipalities "must
include a vast reservoir if government is to be equal to the obligation
115
to govern."
These ordinances have taken both the owners' and the tenants'
interests into account, and actually attempt to reconcile the imbalance
that exists by accommodating the rights of both sides to achieve fairness. The ordinances under attack in Inganamort represent an attempt
to produce an equilibrium, and should be given a chance to prevail.
Richard J. Rodrick
court, in order to ascertain the viability of a real emergency, look above and beyond the
mere declaration of it in the legislative enactment. See generally 3 J. SuTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNs-rucrcoN § 7212, at 442 (3d ed. 1943).
113 120 N.J. Super. at 330, 293 A.2d at 744. See generally Exec. Order No. 11,627,
3 C.F.R. 587 (1972).
114 Behnke v. Highway Authority, 13 N.J. 14, 25, 97 A.2d 647, 653 (1953). See also
Lincoln Plaza Assoc. v. Barbarisi, 60 Misc. 2d 905, 907, 304 N.Y.S.2d 545, 548 (Civ. Ct.
1969) (city receiving rent control power from state need not be bound by previously
imposed controls).
115 Wagner v. City of Newark, 42 N.J. Super. 193, 205, 126 A.2d 71, 77 (L. Div. 1956).

